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FROM BASIC
TO HALLIBURTON
fudges made the securitiesclass action mess, but who can clean it up?
BY M. TODD HENDERSON AND ADAM C. PRITCHARD
ecurities fraud class actions are big business for
lawyers. Since 1996, nearly 4,000 suits have been
filed, with the majority resulting in companies
paying substantial settlements. The top 10 settlements alone totaled about $35 billion; plaintiffs'
lawyers took home billions in fees. Companies
paid their own lawyers similar sums for defending
them. If spending these gigantic sums on lawyers deterred corporate fraud (that is, if they helped sort cases of actual fraud from
mere business reverses), then that might be money well spent.
But if lawyers are paid billions without reducing the probability
or magnitude of corporate fraud, then from a social welfare perspective these payments to lawyers are a deadweight loss.
When thinking about the efficiency of the private litigation
system, the relevant comparison is not to an enforcement vacuum,
but rather to government enforcement of antifraud prohibitions.
The Securities and Exchange Commission and the Department
ofJustice are authorized to bring suits to enforce the securities
laws in general and antifraud rules specifically. Absent a system
of private suits, presumably the government would pick up
some of the slack. The choice between public and private is not
obvious. Private litigation could be more effective and efficient
than government enforcement against corporate fraud because
of the financial incentives private lawyers may have to ferret out
fraud and bring complex cases. If the rules of the game are not
finely tuned, however, these large financial incentives can result
in litigation having nuisance value unrelated to the merits of any
fraud claim. Unfortunately, the securities class action system in
use today gives scant confidence that private litigation is striking
the right balance in encouraging socially desirable suits while
discouraging nuisance claims.
In a representative democracy, you might think that the peoM. TODD HENDERSON is the MichaelJ. Marks Professor of Law and Aaron
Director Teaching Scholar at the University ofChicago Law School.
ADAM C. PRITCHARD is the Frances and George Skestos Professor of Law at the
University of Michigan Law School.

ple's representatives in Congress would make the choice between
public and private enforcement of antifraud principles. But the
current system of private suits as the primary mechanism for
policing corporate fraud comes not from Congress but from
the courts. Judges, egged on by the SEC, created the securities
class action industrial complex on their own. There is nothing
in the statute-in this case, § I0(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934-that authorizes a private cause of action for securities
fraud. Instead, the courts invented it out of whole cloth, ignoring
private causes of action explicitly created by Congress in other
parts of the statute. Over the ensuing decades, the Supreme Court
has at various times expanded and contracted the private cause
of action, based on virtually no empirical data on how securities
class actions work in the real world. In general, however, the § 10(b)
private right of action has grown from what William Rehnquist
called a "legislative acorn" into a "judicial oak."
Securities class actions really took off after Basic v. Levinson,
a 1988 Supreme Court case that held plaintiffs need not show
individual reliance on alleged corporate misrepresentations, but
instead could rely on the market price having incorporated those
misstatements: the "fraud-on-the-market" (FOTM) presumption.
This meant that certifying a class action became much easier for
plaintiff lawyers, while defendants would face enormous costs
from litigating and settling the suits. The incentives to bring
cases for nuisance value alone were enormous. After Basic there
was a huge spike in securities litigation, but almost never did
those suits get to the question of whether corporate fraud had
actually occurred. Stock prices dropped (by reason of fraud or
otherwise), suits were brought, and settlement monies were paid.
Former shareholders got pennies from current shareholders, and
lawyers (and their experts) took home the real money.
Congress responded to that flood of cases by tweaking the rules
of securities class action a bit in 1995, and the Supreme Court has
tried to trim the oak it created in a series of controversial decisions.
Neither Congress nor the Court was willing to cut down the tree
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and start anew, in part because the Court never squarely faced the
issue of whether to overrule Basic-atleast, until recently.
A case in the last Supreme Court term-known in legal circles
as HalliburtonH-presented the question of whether Basic should
be overruled, thus presenting the Court an opportunity to rethink
securities fraud class actions altogether. Instead of pursuing
fundamental reform, the Court tinkered around the periphery,
adding a new battle of the experts to these cases. The Court's Halliburton II decision arguably makes a bad situation worse. At the
very least, it will make these suits more expensive for shareholders,
without any obvious benefit in terms of deterring corporate fraud.
In other words, the Court's decision will yield more costs with no
benefits, or what one might call a lose-lose.
In this essay, we briefly present the core economic and legal
issues presented in the most recent battle over the FOTM presumption. We show how the Court missed an opportunity to
reduce wasteful litigation and redirect legal resources toward
deterring actual corporate fraud. We also argue that despite the
Court's inviting Congress to address the problems of securities
fraud class actions, Congress is unlikely to accept that invitation.
We also outline what fundamental reform would look like if
Washington could be spurred to action. In our view, meaningful
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reform of securities fraud class actions needs to begin with reining
in the grossly inflated measure of damages used in such cases. The
SEC, however, stands in the way of reforming the damages measure in securities fraud class actions. As a result, corporations may
resort to self-help to eliminate securities class actions altogether.

INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND: SECONDARY
MARKET SECURITIES FRAUD CLASS ACTIONS

Congress did not create a general private cause of action for fraud
when it enacted the Securities Exchange Act in 1934, instead opting to create narrow causes of action for specific types of conduct,
like market manipulation. Congress did, however, authorize the
SEC to adopt antifraud rules that the agency could then enforce.
The SEC exercised that rulemaking authority in 1940 when it
adopted Rule lob-S. The rule, like § 10(b) (the statutory provision
that authorizes the rule), says nothing about a private cause of
action. The courts, however, have not been deterred by that void
and have implied a sweeping cause of action under Rule lob-S.
Courts being courts, they have relied heavily on the familiar
requirements of common law deceit (the typical cause of action
for fraud) in fleshing out the details of that Rule lob-S cause of
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action. At common law, plaintiffs were required to claim that they
had relied on the allegedly fraudulent misstatement and that it
induced them to make the purchase. So for a fraud claim involving a company's common stock, an investor-plaintiff would have
to show that he read the misstatements that allegedly distorted
the price of a company's stock before he purchased (or sold) the
stock. The problem, however, is that for companies whose shares
are publicly traded, many (perhaps most) of the investors buying
and selling the company's shares will not have read the misstatement or even been aware of it, so they will not be able to claim
reliance in the traditional sense. Thus, the reliance requirement
posed a substantial obstacle to bringing a case under Rule lob-S.
Ifall plaintiffs were required to allege that they had read and relied
on the misstatement in making their decision to purchase, a class
could not be certified because it would have too many factual
questions that were not common to the class (a prerequisite to
class certification). And individual investors would rarely have sufficient losses to justify the expense of bringing suit on their own.
To overcome this obstacle, the Supreme Court effectively gutted the reliance requirement for most claims of secondary market
fraud with its decision in Basic. The Basic Court, withJustice Harry
Blackmun writing for the majority, adopted the so-called "fraud
on the market" presumption of reliance. The FOTM presumption
allows plaintiffs to skip the step of alleging personal reliance on
the misstatement, instead allowing them to allege that the market
relied on the misrepresentation in valuing the security and that,
in turn, the plaintiffs relied on the market price that was distorted
by the deception. The economic premise underlying the FOTM
presumption is the efficient capital market hypothesis, which
holds that markets rapidly incorporate information-true or
false-into the market price of a security. Thus, the price paid by
the plaintiffs would have been inflated by the fraud, establishing
a causal connection between the fraud, the purchase, and the
loss. For Blackmun, the economic analysis was painfully obvious:
"Who would knowingly roll the dice in a crooked crap game?"
Justice Byron White, dissenting in Basic, worried the economics
were more complicated: "[T]he Court, I fear, embarks on a course
that it does not genuinely understand, giving rise to consequences
it cannot foresee." Presciently, White noted that adopting the
appropriate measure of damages was critical to the implementation of the Court's new FOTM regime. White also noted that
Blackmun and the Court majority had ducked that issue.
Without any guidance from the Supreme Court on the question of damages, lower courts assumed that the traditional out-ofpocket measure of damages, typically applied in face-to-face cases
offraud, also applied in FOTM cases. The out-of-pocket measure
gives shareholder- plaintiffs the difference between the price they
paid and the securities' "true" value at that time. Combining that
measure with the FOTM presumption exponentially expanded
the potential damages exposure for companies whose stock
traded on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) or Nasdaq. Every
investor who purchased while a misrepresentation was affecting

the company's stock price-and did not sell it before the truth
was revealed-has a cause of action under Rule lob-S against the
company and its officers. Importantly, however, the company
will be the primary target in these suits, despite the fact that the
corporation will rarely have sold securities during the time of the
alleged fraud. Because the company did not benefit from fraud, it
has no institutional incentive to spend real resources in executing
the fraud-and thus no reason to encourage the investor reliance
that the FOTM presumption seeks to promote.
Worse still, the out-of-pocket measure of damages relied on
by the lower courts provides no offset for the windfall gain on
the other side of the trade. For every shareholder who bought at a
fraudulently inflated price, another shareholder sold: the buyer's
individual loss is offset by the seller's gain. But the investors lucky
enough to have been selling during the period of the fraud do not
have to give their profits back. Consequently, the out-of-pocket
measure exaggerates the social harm caused by FOTM because
it fails to account for the fact that losses and gains will be a wash
for shareholders in the aggregate, although some individual
shareholders on the losing side will suffer substantial losses in
particular cases. The net social losses are nearly zero in almost all
of these cases. But given the trading volume in secondary markets,
the potential recoverable damages in securities class actions can be
a substantial percentage of the corporation's total capitalization,
easily reaching hundreds of millions of dollars and sometimes
billions of dollars. Despite this incoherence, the out-of-pocket
measure persists, and as a result class actions are a big stick to
wield against fraud, real or imagined. Companies confronting
FOTM lawsuits, if they cannot get the case dismissed at an early
stage, have little choice but to settle. Going to trial to seek exoneration means risking a potentially bankrupting judgment.

THE DELUGE AND THE RESPONSE

The FOTM presumption of reliance was adopted by the Supreme
Court to facilitate securities fraud class actions. Measured by
this criterion, Basic was a tremendous success. The number of
securities fraud class actions increased dramatically after Basic
validated the FOTM presumption.
Although the FOTM presumption ensured that private plaintiffs would have incentives to sue, the out-of-pocket measure of
damages meant that the incentives to sue were excessive. The
FOTM presumption generated too many suits because the defendants' incentive to settle these cases has little to do with the
merits: even a small prospect of losing at trial puts a big thumb
on the scale toward settlement, even if the company has done
nothing wrong. The math is simple: a 1 percent chance of losing a
$2 billion judgment makes it economically rational to cut a check
for $20 million, even ignoring the massive costs of mounting a
defense. Even supremely confident defendants will settle meritless cases. Such settlements are wasteful; investors do not benefit
when companies pay settlements that have little to do with the
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merits of the case because the settlements generate no deterrence.
Securities class actions are a costly form of insurance against fraud
and business reverses, and investors are the ones who ultimately
foot the bill. Only the lawyers are enriched.
Even in cases of actual fraud, the FOTM regime is far from
optimal. To see this, consider that any lies are told not by "the
company"-an artificial legal construct-but by executives who
speak on its behalf These individuals may benefit from the lies
along with any shareholders who sell their shares after the lies
but before the fraud is revealed. But these people would not pay
damages to compensate those who buy shares after the lies and
hold the shares. The company pays the losing investors, which
effectively means current shareholders pay, even though they do
not profit from the lies. This transfer of wealth from innocent
current shareholders to former shareholders (with a big chunk
going to lawyers) serves no obvious retributive purpose. And with
wrongdoing managers typically not paying any portion of the
damages, the case for deterrence is weak as well.
The incentives unleashed by Basic spawned a flood of securities fraud suits, often targeting start-up firms with high volatility,
regardless of connection to actual fraud. When the stock prices of
those firms fell, plaintiffs' lawyers filed suits and then combed disclosures for potential misstatements. Settlements followed quickly,
however, obviating any need to find fraud. The consequence was
a tax on risk, raising the cost of capital for start-up firms.
In response, Republicans made securities class action reform
a centerpiece of their Contract with America in 1994. When the
Republicans took control of Congress that year, they passed the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), with
substantial Democratic support necessary to override President Bill
Clinton's veto. Supporters summarized the target of their reforms:
"the routine filing of lawsuits against issuers of securities and others whenever there is a significant change in an issuer's stock price,
without regard to any underlying culpability of the issuer, and with
only faint hope that the discovery process might lead eventually to
some plausible cause of action."
The PSLRA made a number of reforms intended to reduce the
extortionate threat of securities class actions. For example, it raised
the standards for pleading fraud, delayed discovery until after a
hearing on a motion to dismiss, and changed the selection of lead
counsel from a race to the courthouse to a presumption in favor
of the attorney chosen by the shareholder-plaintiff with the largest
economic stake in the outcome. Congress, however, did not address
the underlying drivers of these suits: the FOTM presumption and the
perverse measure of damages. The House of Representatives considered eliminating the FOTM presumption, but the SEC opposed the
provision and it was abandoned in favor of a codification of FOTM
that would have set forth more clearly when the presumption would
apply. By the time the bill came out of conference, this codification
ofthe FOTM presumption also had been abandoned. The result was
a stalemate on the FOTM presumption.
Meanwhile, the Supreme Court heard several big cases with
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Basic's FOTM presumption lurking in the background. Its restrictive decisions suggest that the Court viewed the system as fundamentally broken. In Central Bank ofDenver v. FirstInterstate Bank of
Denver (1994), the Court held that there was no aiding and abetting
liability for private securities fraud suits. The Court extended this
ruling to cover alleged schemes to defraud in Stoneridge Investment
Partnersv. Scientific Atlanta (2008), and inJanusCapital Group v. First
Derivative Traders (2011), which limits liability to the legal entity
that actually makes a misstatement. In another series of cases,
the Court narrowly interpreted the concept of causation. In Dura
Pharmaceuticalsv. Broudo (2005), the Court held that it was not
enough for plaintiffs to show they bought shares at prices inflated
by lies; they also had to show that the revelation of the lies caused
the stock price to drop. Finally, in Tellabs v. Makor Issues & Rights
(2007), the Court interpreted the PSLRA's pleading standard to
require that plaintiffs show-in their complaint-that the inference
of a fraudulent intent was as strong as any innocent explanation.
These cases, which repeatedly erected barriers to plaintiffs bringing
securities class actions, make sense only against the backdrop of a
highly dysfunctional system for deterring corporate fraud.
Although one could reasonably view this series of cases as the
Supreme Court trying to tame the beast it unleashed upon the
corporate world, in more recent cases the Court balked at killing
the beast all together. In Erica R John Fund v. Halliburton (2011),
commonly called HalliburtonI, the Court refused to extend the
Dura rule to the class certification stage; it held that plaintiffs do
not have to show loss causation at the class certification stage to
invoke the FOTM presumption. Similarly, in Amgen v. Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds (2013), the Court held that
plaintiffs are not required to prove alleged misstatements were
material (that is, something a reasonable investor would care
about when making an investment decision) at the class action
certification stage. Instead, the plaintiff would only be required
to prove materiality at trial. The Court refused to fashion special
rules for certifying securities class actions, notwithstanding its
apparently skeptical view of the merits of many of those claims.
Or perhaps the Court saw the PSLRA as reducing the incidence
of frivolous suits to an acceptable level. (See "Securities Litigation
after Amgen," Spring 2014.)
Against this background, it was somewhat surprising that in
Amgen four justices-Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, Anthony
Kennedy, and Samuel Alito-each separately urged the Court to
reconsider Basic altogether. The Court took up this invitation
when its remand in Halliburton I came back to the Court for
consideration in HalliburtonII.

HALLIBURTON II
The defendants in HalliburtonH argued that Basic should be overruled and that plaintiffs should have to show they relied on alleged
misstatements. Such a decision would have made securities fraud
class actions effectively impossible, likely rendering private enforce-
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ment under § 10(b) a dead letter. (Corporate fraud would not have
been left entirely unchecked because there would still be the threats
of government enforcement, state law claims, and a variety of other
potential federal law claims for private plaintiffs to pursue.)
Halliburton's argument for overruling Basic was premised
on empirical research raising doubts about the efficient capital
market hypothesis, which was the basis of Basic's conclusion
that plaintiffs can rely on the market to quickly incorporate all
information (true or false) into stock prices. Chief Justice John
Roberts expressed the concern at oral argument in HalliburtonHI
when he noted that the justices were not well positioned to digest
the financial economics: "How am I supposed to review the economic literature and decide which [side in this case] is correct...?"
Roberts is certainly correct that issues of financial economics are
beyond the ken of most judges. Unfortunately, the Basic FOTM
presumption, which the Court preserved in HalliburtonH, requires
trial judges to make similarly fraught economic decisions in
determining market efficiency.
We filed an amicus brief in which we argued that instead
of scrappingBasic's FOTM presumption altogether, the Court
should require plaintiffs to show "price impact" in order to certify
a class. Price impact means the alleged misrepresentations caused
the stock price to rise or stay steady when it otherwise would have
fallen. Our proposal would have reformed FOTM class actions,
putting them on a more solid economic footing. This argument
went to the second question presented in HalliburtonHI: "Whether,
in a case where the plaintiff invokes a presumption of reliance to
seek class certification, the defendant may rebut the presumption
and prevent class certification by introducing evidence that the
misrepresentations did not distort the market price of its stock."
Crucially, our proposal hinged on plaintiffs bearing the burden of
proof at the class certification stage to show price impact, eliminating largely irrelevant debates about the efficiency of markets.
Requiring plaintiffs (or, rather, the plaintiffs' lawyers) to show
price impact would discourage them from bringing weak cases
for their settlement value.
We argued that disputes over market efficiency were dragging
district courts into costly and uncertain territory. Worse, the
market efficiency requirement biases suits toward firms trading
in obviously efficient markets (like the NYSE) instead of arguably
less efficient ones (like the over-the-counter "pink sheets"). This is
perverse because the probability of fraud is much lower for publicly traded firms on the large exchanges relative to more thinly
traded over-the-counter stocks. Companies whose securities
trade in "inefficient" markets-e.g., smaller companies and debt
issuers-are essentially immune to securities class actions, even
though those issuers are more likely to commit fraud because
they generally lack the elaborate internal controls and Big Four
auditors employed by the largest companies.
The Court in HalliburtonHI rejected our argument, preserving
the requirement that plaintiffs show market efficiency to invoke
the FOTM presumption. It did, however, allow defendants to prove

there was no price impact from the alleged misrepresentation.
This makes little sense. The HalliburtonH decision does nothing to
discourage plaintiffs' lawyers from going after the deepest pockets
or targeting firms that trade in more efficient markets. But the decision does add a new battle of the experts that will further increase
the already enormous cost of litigating these cases.
Under HalliburtonH, defendants will call on economists to testify that the alleged misstatements did not affect the market price;
plaintiffs will respond with their own economists who will testify
that it did. Markets vary in the speed with which they incorporate
information. Moreover, the significance of the information matters, so it can be a challenging task to establish whether a statement affected the market price. That challenge can be particularly
daunting if a company releases multiple pieces of information at
the same time. With the burden of proof on defendants, many
trial judges-faced with conflicting economic evidence that they
are scarcely equipped to evaluate-will opt to certify a class. Consequently, the watered-down role for price impact evidence adopted
by the Court in HalliburtonHI is likely to have minimal real-world
effect on the mix of cases pursued by plaintiffs. Despite the limited prospects for success and the added litigation expense, it will
be the rare defense lawyer that does not take advantage of the
opportunity afforded by the HalliburtonHI decision; after all, they
bill by the hour. Insurers will raise premiums paid by companies
for directors' and officers' insurance to compensate. Recall that
those premiums are ultimately born by shareholders.
Why did the Court make a legal move that was such a clear
policy mistake? The Court fell back on stare decisis-it was reluctant to overturn (or even reform) a decades-old precedent that
had become such a central feature of modern securities fraud
litigation. The Court's rationale for its timid approach was that
more robust reform would require it to choose sides in a dispute
about financial economics for which it was poorly equipped to
evaluate. In reality, by choosing to retain the FOTM presumption,
it did choose a side. The side it chose pushes in the direction of
excessive amounts of litigation, targeting the wrong actors and
yielding dubious deterrence of fraud.
The Court made it clear that it expects Congress to make any
substantive reform to securities class actions, despite the fact that
the Court created the current securities class action regime out of
whole cloth. (Of course, the Court could have overruled Basic and
given Congress the same invitation to create an explicit private
right of action in the statute. That is effectively what happened
in the wake of Central Bank of Denver-Congress responded by
adding a public right of action for aiding and abetting in § 20(e)
of the Securities Exchange Act.) But Congress is unlikely to take
the Court up on that invitation, as we explain below.

WHO CAN FIX THIS MESS?
With its decision in HalliburtonH, the Supreme Court has made it
painfully clear that it lacks the appetite for fundamental reform
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in securities class actions. Although judicial modesty may be
a virtue, it is an odd response when the Court made the mess
in the first place. Moreover, the Court's deference to Congress
seems misplaced when the politicians have also shown no appetite for reform. The Court's commitment to staredecisis also likely
carries little weight with the shareholders who (involuntarily)
foot the bill for the Court's experiment in fraud deterrence
policy. Indeed, the Court's continued tinkering around the edges
of securities class actions has made a bad situation worse, as
witnessed in HalliburtonII.
The fact of the matter is that the Court simply lacks the requisite institutional expertise for reform, even if it had the appetite.
The members of the Court are all former government officials,
academics, and appellate advocates. They are all highly talented
lawyers but, simply put, they are not equipped to confront the
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institutional interests because the agency favors broad interpretations of its governing statutes. The SEC's commitment to the
plaintiffs' bar goes beyond that interest, however, as it sides with
the plaintiffs' bar even on issues that relate purely to the terms of
the implied Rule lob-5 cause of action, like the price impact issue
in HalliburtonfI. This commitment can only be ascribed to ideology, as the agency staff views its investor protection role broadly
and sees plaintiffs' lawyers as allies in that fight. The SEC has the
authority to make the necessary changes to Rule 1Ob-5, but given
the agency's track record as a securities class action booster, it is
unrealistic to expect reform to come from that quarter.
Perhaps shareholders could take matters into their own hands.
They have the right incentives for evaluating reforms because they
are forced to internalize both the benefits and costs of securities
class actions. They benefit from securities class actions if those suits
generate deterrence. Deterrence promotes
accurate share prices and thereby reduces
the cost of participation in the securities
markets. Those benefits flow to corporations as well because they translate into a
lower cost of capital. Shareholders (at least
some of them) are also the beneficiaries of
the compensation paid out in securities
class actions, modest though it may be. On

Although judicialmodesty may be a virtue, i is an odd
response when the Court made the mess in th
Morover the deference to Congressseems mis placed when
thepoliticianshave also shown no appetitefo reform.

the other side of the equation, shareholders

highly technical field of securities law. It has been almost 30 years
since the last justice with substantial experience as a corporate
lawyer-Lewis F. Powell Jr.-retired from the Court. The Court
has made it clear that it prefers to leave the field to Congress.
That deference may come, in part, from the realization that the
justices are not up to the task of reforming securities class actions.
Is it realistic to expect reform to come from Congress? Not
anytime soon. As noted above, Congress punted on the question
of the FOTM presumption when it adopted the PSLRA in 1995.
Why? Political reality: two powerful constituencies were diametrically opposed. For the plaintiffs' bar, the FOTM presumption was
the foundation of their (lucrative) livelihood; repealing it would be
an existential threat. On the other side of the battle was corporate
America, particularly the high tech sector, wailing that lawsuits
were chilling growth and destroying jobs. Neither side had the
political clout to declare outright victory. Congress tightened the
screws on securities class actions, but never seriously threatened
to end FOTM suits. With big donors on both sides, the FOTM
presumption was simply too politically hot to handle.
Perhaps the SEC, an independent agency, could rise above
the political fray? Its opposition to reform during the legislative process leading up to the PSLRA is hardly promising, and
the SEC's subsequent positions are no more encouraging. The
SEC consistently sides with the plaintiffs' bar in its amicus role.
The SEC's support for the plaintiffs' bar in part reflects its own

(all of them this time) ultimately bear the
costs of securities fraud class actions, which
include the payment of attorneys' fees on both sides of the litigation,
the cost of experts, and the distraction costs to executives arising
from defending lawsuits. Directors and officers' insurance will cover
some of those costs, but the premiums to secure that insurance
are ultimately paid by the shareholders. Less tangible, but perhaps
more substantial, are costs firms incur to avoid being sued. yet more
money spent on lawyers' fees for flyspecking disclosure documents,
higher auditors' fees, new projects that are rejected because of the
risk of suit, and less forthcoming disclosure. Those costs are not
covered by insurance. How does the balance tip between the benefits
of deterrence and its costs? Perhaps shareholders should be allowed
to weigh for themselves.
One possibility would be to allow the shareholders to change
the damages measure in Rule lOb-5 securities fraud class actions
involving the company, its officers, and directors, to focus on deterrence rather than compensation. Specifically, shareholders could
adopt an unjust enrichment model by making a partial waiver of
the FOTM presumption of reliance in the corporation's articles of
incorporation. The waiver would stipulate to a disgorgement measure of damages, requiring violators to give up the benefits of the
fraud, if the FOTM presumption were invoked in a securities class
action. This partial waiver would not limit shareholder-plaintiffs
who could plead actual reliance on a misstatement; they could still
seek the standard out-of-pocket measure of damages in those cases.
Thus, in a FOTM suit, the company itselfwould only be liable when
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making an offering or repurchasing shares. It would only be liable
for out-of-pocket compensation to plaintiffs who actually relied
on the misstatement to their detriment. Executives who violated
Rule lob-S would be liable to repay their compensation tied to
the stock price (bonuses, stock, and options) during the time that
price was fraudulently manipulated; here the FOTM presumption
could be invoked.
Obviously the damages paid under a disgorgement measure
are unlikely to afford full compensation, but settlements currently
only compensate for a trivial percentage of investor losses. More
fundamentally, compensation is not the answer to securities fraud
in the secondary market; diversification protects investors more
completely (and cheaply) than lawsuits ever could. The goal of
securities fraud class actions should be that ofunjust enrichment:
deterrence. The purpose of the FOTM version of the Rule lob-S
cause of action should be to deprive wrongdoers of the benefits
they obtained by violating Rule lob-S.
Can shareholders amend corporate charters to fix this badly
broken system? The staff of the SEC takes the position that such
waivers are illegal. Section 29 of the Exchange Act voids "[a]ny
condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person to waive
compliance with any provision of this title or of any rule or regulation thereunder." Read broadly, § 29 would bar any provision
affecting a right created by the Exchange Act. And written broadly,
an anti-reliance provision could arguably waive compliance with
§ 10(b) (although SEC and criminal enforcement would still
be available). The Supreme Court has not addressed waiver of
reliance clauses; it has only interpreted § 29 in connection with
mandatory arbitration clauses. After initially concluding that
arbitration provisions conflicted with the anti-waiver provisions
in the securities law, the Court reversed course, concluding that
forum selection clauses and arbitration provisions were enforceable because they did not affect any "substantive obligation"
imposed by the Exchange Act.
The SEC, however, takes the position that the FOTM presumpdon is a substantive obligation of the Exchange Act, despite the fact
that it was created by the Supreme Court, not Congress. Moreover,
the Supreme Court has described the FOTM presumption as "a
substantive doctrine of federal securities-fraud law" in Amgen and
HaliburtonII, although the Court has not explained why. So a waiver
of the FOTM presumption may be a non-starter under current law.
Another response to the problem of securities fraud class
actions would be for shareholders to amend the corporate charter
to require such disputes to be settled in arbitration, without the
ability to consolidate individual cases into a class action. A consistent series of decisions from the Supreme Court interpreting
the Federal Arbitration Act strongly supports the enforceability
of such a provision. The SEC's staff disagrees of course, taking
the position that arbitration clauses violate § 29, notwithstanding
the contrary Supreme Court precedent.
Assuming the resistance of the SEC could be overcome, would
investors favor such clauses? An arbitration clause is something of

a nuclear option, eliminating both the deterrent value of securities
class actions and the waste they engender. Investors presumably all
favor deterrence, but their interests may diverge on the availability
of compensation, which might be hard to come by under a regime
requiring arbitration. The relatively low rate of participation by
retail shareholders in securities class action settlements suggests
that they do not value compensation all that highly. Shareholders who are "holders," trading infrequently, are likely to favor an
arbitration regime because they are typically on the paying end
of litigation and settlement in class actions. Investors who index,
whether individual or institutional, are likely to see things the
same way as holders. Indexers have protected themselves against
the firm-specific risk of fraud through diversification; they are
unlikely to favor paying large premiums to lawyers for additional
insurance that they do not need. The votes of institutional investors who actively pick stocks are harder to handicap. On the one
hand, they are more likely to have been trading during a fraud
period, so they are more likely to be members of an FOTM class.
On the other hand, the proposed regime would still allow such
investors to pursue arbitration, which might be feasible if they
made a large (losing) bet on a stock.
Of course, we will get prompt feedback if investors make the
wrong call in voting to adopt an arbitration clause. If eliminating
FOTM class actions undermines deterrence, we would expect to
see a stock price drop for a firm that requires arbitration of securities disputes. That will be powerful evidence for opponents of
arbitration. If, on the other hand, the stock price response is positive, shareholders of other firms are likely to follow the pioneering
firm's lead in requiring arbitration. We should at least encourage
shareholders to experiment so that we can get an answer to the
question ofwhether shareholders-those who the current system
is supposed to benefit-value it as much as the lawyers and SEC do.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court has struggled for 25 years with the wrong
turn it took in Basic.The FOTM regime established in Basic shifts
money from one shareholder pocket to another at enormous
expense. In HalliburtonH, the Court extinguished any hope that
it would fix its prior error. The Court's institutional commitment to stare decisis-perhaps coupled with an awareness of its
own limitations-kept it from making any meaningful change.
Congress and the SEC have both had the opportunity to fix the
problem created by Basic, but neither of those institutions has
risen to the occasion.
Shareholders bear the costs of the FOTM regime, and shareholders have the power to end those costs by adopting arbitration
provisions. That "nuclear option" comes at a cost, however, as it
eliminates entirely the deterrent value of securities class actions.
Will shareholders clean up the mess that the Supreme Court has
created with securities class actions by requiring arbitration of
securities fraud claims? Stay tuned.

